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China And Laos: Different Roads to the Market
John McDonnell* and Douglas Clark**
INTRODUCTION
A potent debate is taking place between scholars who spe-
cialize in observing the planned economies of Asia. The debate
focuses on the prospects for a "third way" to sustained economic
growth and prosperity which consists of neither market capital-
ism nor fully planned socialism. Put simply, the third way de-
scribes an economy where both planned and market economies
co-exist.1
Although China and Laos possess different physical charac-
teristics and historical backgrounds, similarities exist in their
traditional cultures and their paths of modern development.
The economy and law in both countries until the nineteenth
century can be described as predominantly feudal and based on
kinship ties. It was not until the late ninteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries that industrialization and Western-style legal
codes came to China and Laos. Even then, Western-style eco-
nomic development was confined to the larger cities in both
* John McDonnell is a Barrister and Solicitor in Australia and served as
a Special Trade Advisor to the Government of the People's Republic of China,
1986-88. B.A., LL.B., B.Econ., J.D., LL.D. (Hon).
** Douglas Clark is a student in the Faculties of Law and Asian Studies,
Australian National University, Canberra. Grad. Cert. Chinese Law (Fudan).
All Chinese language sources quoted in this article were translated by the au-
thors. The Pinyin system of romanization has been used, except where people
or places are better known by another form.
1. As Nolan puts it:
Instead of the market being viewed as an enemy to be crushed ('Capi-
talism is like a dog in the water to be beaten'), markets and competi-
tion [are] viewed as an essential part of the process of running a
successful economy. The model [being] that of the Soviet and Chinese
NEP [New Economic Policy] periods, with the intention being to en-
able the benefits of planning and the 'magic whip of competition' to
operate in tandem.
P. Nolan, China's Experience in Comparative Perspective, a Paper Prepared for
a Conference on the Chinese Economy in the Reform Period, Nov. 1991, Austra-
lian National University, at 8. An early development of theory concerning the
third way in relation to both capitalist and communist economies in general
may be found in OTA SIK, THE THIRD WAY: MARXIST LENINIST THEORY AND
MODERN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1976).
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countries and, in both countries, protracted civil wars leading to
the success of communist revolutions destroyed much of the de-
velopment that had taken place. Further, once in power both
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Laotian People's
Democratic Party (LPDP), despite their countries' low level of
economic development, attempted a rapid transition to socialism
by following the Soviet model of central planning and rapid in-
dustrialization.2 Finally, both countries are now in the process
of reforming their economies.
Thus a comparison of Chinese and Lao contemporary eco-
nomic policies will help in an evaluation of the success and fu-
ture potential of these policies. A comparison is meaningful
because they have adopted very different policy approaches to
economic reform, and thereby offer a basis for comparing
whether the third way or the "one cut of the knife"3 adoption of
market-oriented measures is more successful. More particu-
larly, they will provide a basis for determining whether a strong
legal system is a prerequisite to an open economy.
Supporters of the third way agree with key figures in the
Chinese leadership 4 that an indigenous approach to economic re-
form can result in high growth, despite the continuation of state
intervention in the exchange of goods and services and the ab-
sence of extensive property rights. They assert that such an ap-
proach demands a high degree of political unity and a strong but
benevolent ruling body. An honest administrative system run
by a political apparatus can fulfill the role of an extensive, im-
partial legal system. This new style of authoritarian govern-
ment, at one time called the South Korean Model, provides a
vehicle for focused strategic decision making directed at achiev-
ing long-term goals. Such a government is immune from "plu-
ralistic" or "democratic" compromises which inhibit growth and
2. The correctness of this Soviet model has been the subject of much theo-
retical debate. Marx argued that socialism was only possible once an economy
had achieved a high degree of material wealth, this wealth being created during
the capitalist stage of development. The Soviet model, on the other hand, sug-
gests that it is possible to bypass the capitalist stage. See C. Linden, Marxism-
Leninism in the Soviet Union and the PRC Utopia in Crisis, in CHINA AND
THE CRISIS OF MARXISM-LENINISM 12-15 (Franz Michael et al. eds., 1990); S.
CHIN, THE THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG: FORM AND CONTENT 8-10 (1979); Mao
Zedong, The Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party, in 1 SELECTED
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 311.
3. Nolan, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See, e.g., Jiang Zemin, Building Socialism the Chinese Way, Speech at a
Meeting Marking the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist
Party of China (July 1991), BEIJING REV., July 8-14, 1991, at 20.
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the improvement of popular living standards. Some argue that
this form of authoritarian regime is essential if the market is to
properly perform its role as "the magic whip."5
This is a direct challenge to arguments that such a rational-
ist-positivist approach is impossible because it presumes an un-
realistically high degree of knowledge of the workings of
society.6 Friedrich von Hayek adopted the view that sustained
growth depends on the development of a "spontaneous order" or
"cosmos." Such an environment can be developed only within a
relatively open economy where governments enact laws as a
means to achieve certain goals, rather than the goals themselves
in the form of ideology.8 Most importantly, it depends on the
legal recognition of property rights and the free exchange of
goods.9 Accordingly, this group believes the third way cannot
lead to stable economic growth in socialist countries which have
imported only limited aspects of market economies. Instead,
they argue that such countries will inevitably have to become
full-fledged market economies.
The third way cannot be dismissed as ineffectual Marxist
economics. It has its origins in a structure which precedes com-
munist revolutions, and even Marx himself. Max Weber notes
that in traditional China, economy and law were based on ad-
ministrative municipalities. 10 A comparison of traditional and
5. Nolan, supra note 1, at 10.
6. Friedrich A. von Hayek, 1 LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW
STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
ch. 1-3 (1973) (Volumes 2 and 3 were published in 1976 and 1979, respectively)
[hereinafter 1 HAYEK, 2 HAYEK, 3 HAYEK].
7. 1 HAYEK, supra note 6, at 35-39; 2 HAYEK, supra note 6, at ch. 10, espe-
cially 124-25. See also YUN-WING SUNG, THE CHINA-HONG KONG CONNECTION 1
(1991).
8. Such a spontaneous order can only exist where certain legal rights are
recognized. 1 HAYEK, supra note 6, at 35-39; 2 HAYEK, supra note 6, at ch. 10,
especially 124-25.
9. MAX WEBER ON LAW AND ECONOMY IN SOCIETY 99 (M. Rheinstein ed.,
1954).
10. Weber contrasted Germanic and Roman commercial law with Chinese
law in the following manner:
Municipalities were recognized in official law only as organizations for
carrying the family liability for taxes and charges. On the basis of kin-
ship group membership, they still exercise the strongest conceivable
authority over their members, organize common institutions of all
sorts of economic activity, and manifest a degree of cohesion with
which the officials of the imperial authority had to reckon as with the
strongest local authority. These phenomena which are no more recog-
nized in the legal concepts of official Chinese law than they were any-
where else, have often enough impeded its effectiveness.
I& at 185.
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modern legal and economic structures shows a remarkable de-
gree of similarity, despite the tremendous social upheaval which
accompanied and followed the civil war (1927-1949) and Japa-
nese invasion of China (1937-1945). i i Indeed, the most radical
change in the Chinese legal and economic structure may be the
introduction of the European concept of the market. Deng
Xiaoping has described the process of introducing market re-
forms as "crossing the river by touching stones.' u2
Laos, on the other hand, does not have a strong traditional
legal and administrative base. However, the basic bonds of the
society were based on patrilineal kinship ties and custom, as in
China. Ineffectual regimes ran Laos from the last days of
French governance (1893-1949) until the conclusion of hostilities
which accompanied the communist victory in 1975. Following
the success of the revolution, the LPDP followed a path similar
to that of the CCP. The LPDP attempted to rapidly implement
a full-scale command economy. In 1979, after this strategy failed
to produce positive results, the Lao government gradually intro-
duced a range of market reforms to the state planning system.
In contrast to China, this adoption of the third way was soon
rejected in favor of a more thoroughgoing adoption of market
capitalism.'3 Laos has now completely abandoned state plan-
ning and is attempting to quickly move to a full market economy
with a strong rule of law. The LPDP, however, retains strong
controls over the institutions within Laos and the inevitable con-
frontation between the interests of the party and a formal eco-
nomic apparatus has yet to occur.
In summary, while the Chinese have adopted an approach of
picking their way towards a market economy without any clear
policy or legal framework (an approach which is consistent with
the Maoist dictum of two steps forward and one step back), the
Lao have decided to move directly towards a market economy
and to establish a legal framework appropriate to it. These dif-
ferent approaches have been adopted notwithstanding the fact
that both countries remain under the control of communist gov-
ernments. On the basis of Laos's rejection of the third way in
favor of more rigorous market-oriented reform, this Article ar-
gues that eventually China will be forced to abandon its pursuit
11. Jones, China: A Long-Term Appraisal of Country Risk, in Ross
GARNAUT, CHINA'S REFORMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (forthcoming).
12. Some have added "on one foot" to this phrase to indicate the limits
Deng and the rest of the Chinese leadership have put on the scope of reform.
13. This is characterized as the "big bang" or "one cut of the knife" ap-
proach to market reform. Nolan, supra note 1, at 3.
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of the third way in order to reach a suitable level of economic, if
not political, reform.
I. THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF CHINA
Debate over economic development in China is not limited
to the modern period. Many hold that China in the Song dy-
nasty (960-1279 A.D.) produced unparalleled economic growth
and technological change and that the Mongol invasion which
followed inhibited economic growth and allowed Europe to over-
take China.14 Despite the very advanced technology of the Song
Dynasty, later stagnation left China far behind Europe by the
advent of the industrial revolution. The CCP leadership sup-
ports the view of an economically stagnant traditional China re-
strained by "feudal" institutions, and reformers ominously hark
back to this time when emphasizing market-oriented develop-
ment strategies.
Recently, this view has been revised.'5 A study of Hankow
(now part of Wuhan) demonstrates that China possessed a com-
plex, integrated national market by the mid-eighteenth century,
in which institutional changes fostered trade expansion and new
forms of contract. If this progress had continued, China would
have advanced much closer to an integrated market economy.
These institutional advances were set back,16 however, when the
Taiping Rebellion disrupted the Chinese economy.17
It is possible that legal reform contributed to economic
growth during the Song period and the mid-eighteenth century,
but that these reforms and the development of autonomous cor-
porations engaged in widespread trade were relatively easily dis-
placed by the traditions based on kinship and informal relations
to which Max Weber refers.'8 Less controversial is Weber's con-
clusion that the lack of secure commercial laws, particularly
14. Jones, supra note 11, at 2.
15. WILLIAM T. ROWE, HANKOw: COMMERCE AND SOCIETY IN A CHINESE
CITY, 1796-1889 (1984); THOMAS G. RAWSKI, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN PREWAR
CHINA (1989).
16. This decline of Chinese market-based institutions in the nineteenth
century agrees with Max Weber's view that kinship and political patrimonial-
ism obstructed the development of autonomous corporations engaging in wide-
spread trade. Rowe's view differs from Weber's, however; Weber's analysis
does not argree with the idea of a flourishing market economy at any time.
17. The Taiping Rebellion (1850-1865) failed in its attempt to overthrow
the Qing Dynasty. The rebellion left China chaotic and bankrupt.
18. Jones, supra note 11, at 5.
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contract law, and the ineffective legal apparatus of the nine-
teenth century restricted growth.
This follows the jurisprudential principle that the exercise
of individual choice will not lead to desirable results, such as
economic growth, unless it is ordered (what Hayek describes as
"cosmos" or spontaneous order). Jones's view of China's eco-
nomic history clearly agrees with Hayek's precepts:
For rapid invention, the ordered disorder - the spontaneous, unplan-
ned order - of an open society will ultimately be necessary. For inno-
vation, what is needed are property rights, legal framework, and
incentives for investment also characteristic of such societies but a
fraction less dependent on full 'openness'.
19
In the late Qing dynasty (1644-1911) such order had broken
down. China lacked formal legal codes to regulate, for example,
the banking sector. Individuals were beaten to death for busi-
ness failure, and if judges were unable to decide between liti-
gants they were often both tortured in open court. Jones
concludes that although the Song and the Ming-Qing periods of
Chinese history involved an enormous volume of market activ-
ity, the failure to create universal institutions stifled growth.20
Before its collapse in 1911, the rulers of the Qing dynasty set
about reforming the legal system on the basis of European codes,
a process later continued by the Nationalist (KMT)2 1 govern-
ment, which was never able to consolidate its power over China.
The KMT government enacted a large number of laws and pro-
visional regulations which were eventually drawn together in
six codes enacted between 1929 and 1935, including the Civil
Code and the Commercial Law. Specific laws dealing with com-
mercial activity such as bankruptcy and insurance were also
enacted. 22
Continuous internal turmoil and ineffective administration
within the KMT, however, prevented the effective enforcement
19. Jones, supra note 11, at 16.
20. Jones, supra note 11, at 6. It is possible that incapacity to develop last-
ing institutions was due to some inhibitory cultural factor such as the predilec-
tion for "magic" or "kinship" regulatory norms. Recent work by Rawski
supports this approach. RAWSKI, supra note 15. Jones and others have reserva-
tions. See, e.g., Ramon H. Myers, How did the Modern Chinese Economy De-
velop? AsIAN J. 150 (1991); PHILIP C. C. HUANG, THE PEAsANT FAMILY AND
RuRAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE YANGTzE DELTA, 1350-1988 (1990). These authors
indicate that where the market has been allowed to flourish, the Chinese his-
torically have responded to it positively. This is important because bath the
Chinese and Lao legal systems have their origins in notions of kinship.
21. The Nationalist Party is also known as the Kuomintang (KMT).
22. Alice E. Tay, Law in Communist China - Part 1, 6 SYDNEY L. REV.
153, 164 (1969).
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of these new laws. In rural areas, the KMT government first
battled warlords and, later, the Communists. In the cities, the
primary base of KMT support, the government faced huge
problems implementing the new laws against the entrenched in-
terests of the old ruling elite and corrupt officials.23 The only
places where Western-style economic laws were enforced were
those cities under Western or Japanese control, such as Shang-
hai or Qingdao.24
During the course of the revolution (1927-1949), the CCP
controlled a number of predominantly rural areas in China. The
economy in these areas was primarily agrarian and localized
and, therefore, did not demand a large degree of planning. The
legal system established by the CCP in these areas was primarily
revolutionary in nature and emphasized class struggle over sta-
bility.2 Economic laws were restricted to revolutionary laws
aimed at achieving greater "social justice" such as land reform
decrees and laws which prohibited leasing land for profit.
When the communist takeover of Chinese urban areas was im-
minent, the CCP moderated its stance by promising protection
"to all privately-owned factories, stores, banks, warehouses, ves-
sels, wharves, and the like, except those 'controlled by bureau-
cratic capital.' ,,26 Nevertheless, the CCP abolished all the laws,
decrees and judicial organs set up by the KMT and established a
common program directed at establishing a socialist planned
economy. Under the program, the CCP aimed to transform a
semi-feudal, semi-capitalist economy into a socialist, state-run
economy. Realizing the practical economic and social dislocation
such a conversion would cause, the CCP initially did not directly
attack the capitalist economy. Rather, the CCP reduced the role
of the capitalist economy by levying surcharges against private
transactions, prohibiting money lending, and setting up state-
run distribution systems, thereby cutting "the purse strings and
not the heads of the capitalist class."
By 1954, the CCP had sufficiently established its rule over
the country to enact its first constitution. This constitution ac-
corded priority to the development of the state sector of the
23. JAMES P. BRADY, JUSTICE AND POLITICS IN PEOPLE'S CHINA: LEGAL
ORDER OR CONTINUING REVOLUTION? 52 (1982).
24. For a description of the situation in Shanghai, see Hurst Hannum &
Richard B. Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in International Law, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 858, 868, 871-72 (1980).
25. Tay, supra note 22, at 166.
26. Id at 171.
27. BRADY, supra note 23, at 94-95.
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economy, and the Chinese commenced a policy of rapid industri-
alization. Nevertheless, capitalist ownership was still recognized
as one of four basic forms of ownership, which probably re-
flected internal tensions within the party. Over the following
twenty-five years, however, almost all forms of private owner-
ship of the means of production were nationalized. This process
did not occur without opposition from within the party, most no-
tably from Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who in 1963 started to
introduce limited reforms to revive the private sector. In 1966,
however, Mao Zedong reasserted his control within the party by
unleashing the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), a mass movement
aimed at destroying bureaucratic and capitalistic tendencies.
This movement was accompanied by disregard for pre-existing
legal institutions, which began to regain their vitality after
Mao's death in 1976. Until then, property and all economic ac-
tivity came under the control of the state.28
One legacy of this period of Chinese history is the regulation
of society on the basis of central government directives imple-
mented in an irregular fashion by local administrative units.
More recently, some Chinese leaders have recognized that the
implementation of an impartial legal system is necessary to curb
administrative excesses, control corruption and enforce central
government policies. In this context, the steps that Laos has
taken to implement such a system provide a useful example for
further reform.
II. THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF LAOS
A multiplicity of ethnic groups separated by geographical
and linguistic barriers, a weak communications and transporta-
tion infrastructure, and the lack of strong unifying institutions
other than Buddhism make an analysis of the economic history
of Laos difficult. For centuries the poorest country in Indo-
china, this conglomeration of tribes or clans has eschewed "na-
tion-building" in favor of safeguarding tribal independence.
Laos has rarely been ruled by a national and central govern-
ment. Power struggles have engulfed this small, landlocked
country for much of the last two centuries. Warring ethnic
groups within Laos have been backed by Thailand, Kampuchea,
Burma, France, China, the U.S.S.R., the United States and Viet-
nam. In addition, any attempt to introduce new institutions
would have had to contend with the traditional beliefs of the
28. LINDEN, supra note 2, at 15-18.
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Lao people. Buddhism and animistic customs served as a fur-
ther barrier to the development of formal institutions. Whether
cultural inhibitions or centuries of subjugation prevented the de-
velopment of any institutional framework remains unclear.29
In 1893, Laos was absorbed into French Indochina. The
French soon attempted to introduce their laws. The French,
however, did very little to improve the economy of Laos, limit-
ing themselves to the business of extracting coffee, cotton and
tin. More extensive development and capital investment was re-
stricted by an agricultural economic base, a perceived lack of ex-
port goods, a poor infrastructure and abundant cheap labor.
Consequently, the French did little to establish legal or eco-
nomic structures within Laos. They did not even attempt to es-
tablish a system of education, setting up only one school
designed to cater to the children of high officials. Rather than
undertake institution building, the French allowed the old feu-
dal ruling classes to remain in power as representatives of
French interests.3°
French disinterest limited the development of a monetized
economy to Vientiane and a few other urban areas. Even there,
the laws were often Eurocentric in substance and in conflict
with local customs, such as those regarding land tenure.3 ' The
French Indochina Labour Code drew largely from the exper-
iences of France and other more developed countries, and was
ill-adapted to conditions in Laos. 32
Laos was granted independence from France in 1949.33 It
was soon the site, however, of a civil war between the French-
backed Royal Lao forces and the communist LPDP. For most of
the civil war, Laos was effectively divided into two zones: low-
land southern areas controlled by Royal Lao forces and moun-
tainous northern provinces controlled by the LPDP. As in
29. One suspects that the reality is close to Ch'i's description of warlordism
in China: "[P]olitical disintegration had caused economic disintegration.... As
time went by, however, economic disintegration in turn retarded political rein-
tegration." HSI-SHENG CH'I, WARLORD POLITICS IN CHINA 173 (1976).
30. H. LUTHER, SOCIATUSM IN A SUBSISTENCE ECONOMY: THE LAOTIAN WAY
- AN ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT PATrERNS IN LAOS AFTER 1975 6-7 (Chu-
lalongkorn Univ. Soc. Res. Inst., 1983).
31. DONALD P. WHITAKER ET AL., LAOS: A COUNTRY STUDY 226 (U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1972). Whitaker states that patterns of land tenure in
Laos rest more on tradition and local custom than on law. Id.
32. 1& at 241.
33. The Royal Crown Prince of Laos, at the instigation of the Japanese,
declared independence from France in April, 1945. However, this insurrection
was quickly put down by French forces following the defeat of Japan.
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China, the civil war seriously hampered economic development,
a problem further compounded by the spillover from the Viet-
nam War in the 1960s. Agriculture was the main industry of the
country and was performed in the traditional labor-intensive
fashion.
Larger cities controlled by forces backed by France and the
United States had a limited monetized economy. This economy,
however, was heavily reliant on foreign aid, particularly from
the United States. In rural areas, whether under Royal Lao gov-
ernment or LPDP control, trade was primarily carried out by
barter. During the civil war, the LPDP made little effort to na-
tionalize or collectivize agricultural production. In both zones,
there was a limited amount of light manufacturing. In the Royal
Lao government zone this was carried out by private enterprise,
but as with most other industries, it was heavily dependent on
foreign aid. In the LPDP controlled areas, manufacturing ap-
pears to have been under state control. 34 As production was lim-
ited to a few essential items, however, its economic impact was
small, leaving the economy in the countryside in its traditional
state. The LPDP found itself in charge of a ruined economy af-
ter the fall of the Royal Lao government in 1975. The massive
outflow of skilled technicians and managers who fled to nearby
Thailand and points beyond, compounded the economic damage
suffered from the civil war, the Vietnam War, and the sudden
absence of Western aid.35
Following the Soviet example, the LPDP established the
goal of moving from the traditional economic system directly to
socialism, bypassing capitalism. However, as in China, it did not
seek immediately to abolish the private sector. Nevertheless,
price controls and attempts to discourage profiteering resulted
in the closure of a number of private markets. The shortage of
trained personnel also led to large decreases in production in
both private and nationalized industries. The primary goal was
the collectivization of agriculture, and up to 2800 collective
farms were established by 1979. Within the first five years of
government, the degree of bureaucratic interventionism in Laos
exceeded even that of China so that "a peasant needed up to
seven signatures to cross a provincial line, three to move his pig
to the next village, and one even to kill a chicken." 3
34. WHrTAKER, supra note 31, at 244.
35. MAcALISTER BROWN & JOSEPH J. ZASLOFF, APPRENTICE REVOLUTION-
ARIES: THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN LAos, 1930-1985, 196-97 (1986).
36. Id. at 173. Because of the loss of aid from the United States, Laos was
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III. THE PROCESS OF REFORM IN CHINA AND LAOS
By the mid 1970s China found itself with an extensive
planned economy that was beginning to show signs of being un-
able to meet the needs of the people. At the end of the 1970s,
Laos was in much the same position even though it had not de-
veloped planning institutions as large and sophisticated as those
in China. Laos, however, has since undergone a more radical
transformation in the direction of market-oriented reform. Re-
gardless of whether this change was ideological or pragmatic in
nature, the contrast illuminates the prospects for China's eco-
nomic and legal development.
A. REFORMS IN CHINA
The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 marked a watershed for
China. The "Gang of Four" were removed from power, weaken-
ing the internal party position of those who favored a centrally-
planned economy with a strong emphasis on heavy industry. By
1978, supporters of a mixed approach to development, led by
Deng Xiaoping, were able to introduce wide-ranging economic
and political reforms. The primary goal of the economic reform
program was the rapid but even development of the economy,
with equal emphasis being placed on the development of light
and medium, and heavy industry. One of the stated goals of this
drive was to quadruple the per capita gross national product
(GNP) of the Chinese economy from about $250 in 1980 to $1000
by the year 2000.37 A fundamental element of these reforms has
been an attempt to delegate microeconomic decision making to
industrial and agricultural enterprises,-s rather than the central
government, while allowing the central government to retain a
strong hold on macroeconomic monetary and fiscal controls.
Autonomy from state planning is intended "to give [state owned]
forced to rely on assistance from the Soviet Union. This had some ironic conse-
quences. When the Laotian Vice-Premier Nouhak visited Moscow to secure ad-
ditional aid, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin advised him to stop the drive
towards socialism before even more disgruntled Laotians fled to Thailand.
Nayan Chanda, Economic Changes in Laos, 19754980, in CONTEMPORARY LAOS:
STUDIES IN THE POLITICS AND SOCIETY OF THE LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC RE-
PUBLIC 116, 123 (M. Stuart-Fox ed., 1982).
37. SAMUEL P.S. Ho & RALPH W. HEUNEMAN, CHINA'S OPEN DOOR POLICY:
THE QUEST FOR FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY AND CAPrrAL 8-9 (1984).
38. Communique of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party Central Committee (1978), in JIANCHI GAIGE, KAIFANG,
GAOHUO (UPHOLDING THE REFORMS, OPENING UP TO THE OUTSIDE AND VITALIS-
ING THE ECONOMY) 2 (People's Publishing House, Beijing, 1987).
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enterprises greater flexibility... and responsibility. '3 9
The theoretical underpinnings of the reforms were ex-
plained by Chen Yun, one of the senior leaders of the party. He
argued that during the socialist stage it is necessary to supple-
ment direct government control through state planning with in-
direct control through free market reforms. It is necessary,
therefore, during the entire socialist period to have two eco-
nomic sectors:
(1) The planned economy sector [and]
(2) The market regulated sector. (That is, where there is no
planning and production is only carried out in accordance with market
demand. That is, the sector that is regulated by unseen forces.4° The
first sector is basic and important; the second sector is subordinate and
of secondary importance, nevertheless, it is indispensable.) 4 1
Political reform, though never implemented to the same ex-
tent as economic reform, has been recognized as necessary to al-
low for more rationality in the implementation of economic
reforms. It represents an attempt to move away from reliance
on the personal power of senior leaders to reliance on the power
of institutions, including a state government separate from the
CCP. Reform, however, was not designed to do away with the
leading role of the CCP, nor was it to meant to abolish
socialism.42
1. Reform of the Legal System
Both economically and politically, the development of the
legal system has been a necessary element of the reform pro-
gram. Economically, a legal system was needed to regulate
those parts of the economy no longer directly controlled by state
planning, 43 as well as to attract foreign investors to China by
showing them that their investment would be protected. As
part of the political reform, the legal system was to be the tool
used to separate state and party functions. Law, moreover,
would provide a more efficient method of controlling those who
39. Ho & HUENEMANN, supra note 37, at 11.
40. The original Chinese for "regulated by unseen forces" is you manmux-
ing tiaojie.
41. Chen Yun, Jihua yti Shichang Wenti (The Planning and Market Prob-
lem), in JIANCHI GAIGE, KAIFANG, GAOHUO, supra note 38, at 17-18.
42. Deng Xiaoping, Gaige Zhengzhi Tizhi, Zengqian Fazhi Guannian (Re-
form the Political System, Strengthen Conceptions of the Legal System), in JI-
ANCHI GAIGE, KAiFANG, GAOHUO, supra note 38, at 379-80.
43. QIYE FAL10 SHIYONG SHOUCE, (A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ENTERPRISE
LAw) at Preface (Shanghai People's Pub. House, 1988).
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breached party policy than reliance on internal party and state
controls.
A key element of the reforms was the promulgation in 1982
of a new constitution," as well as the enactment of a number of
laws to control and regulate economic relations and foreign in-
vestment. On its face, the Constitution lays the basis for the ef-
fective establishment of the rule of law. Its three main chapters
set out general principles and the rights and duties of citizens
and the state. It emphasizes the separation of the state and the
CCP, and mentions restrictions on the latter. For example, Ar-
ticle 5 states that "[all] state organs and military forces, every
political party45 and social group, every enterprise and business
organization all must obey the Constitution and law. Every act
breaching the Constitution and law must be investigated." Arti-
cle 128 further provides that "[t]he People's Courts have the
right to independently hear cases, according to law without in-
terference from administrative organs, social groups or
individuals."
Since 1979, a large number of laws regulating economic rela-
tions have been enacted. Their value, however, has been nomi-
nal. Although they provide a framework for economic activity,
the lack of an independent judiciary and the significant role of
informal personal power in China eviscerate their protective
power.
The two main laws regulating domestic economic relations
are the Economic Contract Law and the General Principles of
Civil Law (Civil Law). The former became effective on July 1,
198246 and the latter on January 1, 1987.47 The Economic Con-
tract Law is primarily concerned with the regulation of "eco-
nomic contract relations between such state entities as
enterprises, rural communes and production brigades, state or-
gans, institutions, social organizations and so forth."48 It deals
with the manner in which contracts are to be made and sets out
the basic principles for contract formation, termination, amend-
44. This replaced the "stopgap" 1978 Constitution which had itself replaced
the 1975 Constitution. The new constitution drew heavily on the original 1954
Constitution.
45. Emphasis added.
46. Economic Contract Law, art. 57.
47. General Principles of Civil Law (Civil Law), art. 156.
48. LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPuBLic OF CHINA 552 (Ralph H. Folsom &
John H. Minan eds., 1989) [hereinafter LAw IN THE PRC].
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ing contracts, and remedies for breach of contract.49 The Civil
Law deals with the economic relations in the non-state sector,
such as agreements between private individuals.5° It covers not
only economic contracts but also the regulation of legal guardi-
anship, private household enterprises (getihu), partnerships, do-
mestic joint ventures, agency, civil rights and obligations,
intellectual property rights, personal rights, civil liability in tort
and contract, statutes of limitation, and the application of law to
foreign civil relationships.5' A number of other laws have been
enacted to regulate property and inheritance rights, and to im-
plement a taxation system.
These laws have given legal form to the economic reforms
in China. They also, however, directly limit the scope of the re-
form process. Both the Economic Contract Law and the Civil
Law declare void any contract which contravenes state plan-
ning.52 Both laws provide that void civil acts have no legal effect
from the time the act is commenced. That is, that they are void
ab initio. The inclusion of non-state controlled enterprises
within the confines of the plan and party policy gives legal ex-
pression to the concept of the third way - state planning and
the free market shall coexist, but conflicts between the two will
be resolved in favor of the former. It is not clear if a contract or
civil act would become invalid if a change in the state plan or
state policy caused a previously valid contract to violate the new
plan or policy. The priority given to the plan, however, suggests
that such a contract would be void from the time the change in
policy occurred.
The Chinese have enacted a number of laws which deal
solely with foreign investment and trade to provide greater legal
certainty to wary foreign investors and traders. They have also
established a number of special economic zones (SEZs), which
are designed to attract foreign investment by further limiting
the interference of the state.53
The three basic laws dealing with foreign investment in
China are the Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and For-
eign Investment (Joint Venture Law), the Law on Wholly-For-
49. Gao Yongfu, Economic Contract Laws in China, in LAw IN THE PRC,
supra note 48, at 557-65.
50. LAw IN THE PRC, supra note 48, at 551.
51. An English text of the Civil Law is reprinted in LAw IN THE PRC,
supra note 48, at 1053-76.
52. Economic Contract Law, art. 7(1); Civil Law, art. 58(6).
53. Ann Fenwick, Evaluating China's Special Economic Zones, 2 INT'L
TAX & Bus. LAW 376, reprinted in LAw IN THE PRC, supra note 48, at 733, 735.
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eign Owned Enterprises (Foreign Enterprise Law), and the Law
on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures (New Joint
Venture Law).5 The Joint Venture Law was enacted on July 1,
1979, and came into effect on its date of publication, July 8,
1979.55 It contained only fifteen articles and was thus supple-
mented by extensive regulations which came into effect on Sep-
tember 20, 198 3 .5 The Foreign Enterprise Law came into effect
in April 1986,57 and the New Joint Venture Law came into effect
in 1988.58 The stated purpose of these three laws is the expan-
sion of international cooperation and technology exchange.59
They attempt to ensure the security of investments by providing
that the government shall protect the "lawful rights and inter-
ests" of the parties.60 The Foreign Enterprise Law goes even
further, providing that the "State will not nationalize or expro-
priate wholly owned enterprises." If special circumstances re-
quire nationalization or expropriation, compensation will be
paid.61 More importantly, in the case of wholly foreign-owned
enterprises, Article 11 of the Foreign Enterprise Law provides
that "[n]o interference shall be allowed in the operation and
management activities of a wholly foreign-owned enterprise
conducted according to its approved articles of association."
With regard to foreign trade, the Foreign Economic Con-
tract Law came into effect on July 1, 1985.62 This law applies to
economic contracts concluded between foreigners and Chinese
enterprises. It sets out the requirements for formation and dis-
solution of contract, liabilities for breach, and rules for assign-
ment and dispute resolution. The law does not have a direct
requirement that contracts accord with the state plan. However,
because the domestic Economic Contract Law also applies to
these transactions, such contracts found in conflict with the
54. English texts of these laws and commentary may be found in LAW IN
THE PRC, supra note 48 at 747-84. See also RIcHARD J. GOOSEN, BUSINESS LAW
AND PRACTICE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1987),
55. Joint Venture Law, art. 118.
56. Enforcement Regulations for the Joint Venture Law, art. 118.
57. Foreign Enterprise Law, art. 24.
58. New Joint Venture Law, art. 28.
59. This is stated in Article 1 of the Joint Venture Law, the Foreign Enter-
prise Law, and the New Joint Venture Law.
60. Joint Venture Law, art. 2; Foreign Enterprise Law, art. 4; New Joint
Venture Law, art. 3.
61. Foreign Enterprise Law, art. 4.
62. Article 43, Foreign Economic Contract Law. An English text of this
law is reproduced in LAW IN THE PRC, supra note 48, at 687.
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state plan could be declared void.6
SEZs have been created with two purposes in mind: 1) the
attraction of foreign technical, financial and intellectual invest-
ment, and 2) the limitation of the socially undesirable effects of
such investment to areas separated from the rest of the country.
The Chinese have enacted many laws and regulations in the
SEZs which allow greater freedom of economic activity for both
Chinese nationals and foreigners, and have succeeded in solicit-
ing a very wide breadth of foreign investment.6 4 Nevertheless,
there are still controls on land ownership and an insistence on
the protection of the sovereignty of China.65
This melange of laws directed at regulating foreign eco-
nomic relations provides greater security for foreign-owned enti-
ties transacting business in China than do the domestic laws
regulating transactions between Chinese enterprises. Neverthe-
less, the laws directed at foreign economic relations still operate
in an unstable political and legal environment where political
power and personal connections play a greater role than formal
laws, and may significantly effect the implementation of state
planning and party policies.66
Despite attempts at reform, the dual state-party structure,
and the highly personal nature of power in China, allows the
party or individual party members to influence the way in which
laws are implemented. As one Chinese commentator has noted:
In China today not many people say outright that power is bigger
than law. But actually nowhere in the country has a mechanism yet
been established capable of restricting power abuse in the true sense of
the word. There are no hard and fast rules which can subject power-
holders to legal restrictions or bring power-abusers to justice. Some
power-wielders, who think themselves superior, always take it for
granted that laws are something designed for the rank-and-filers, while
they themselves stand high above the law, far out of its reach and do
not need to be limited by it.
6 7
Thus, despite the articles of the constitution noted above,
China is far from creating a sufficiently independent legal sys-
tem to adequately enforce the rights granted by these and other
63. An Chen, Why Some Sino-Foreign Economic Contracts Are Void and
How to Prevent Voidness, in LAW IN THE PRC, supra note 48, at 699, 700.
64. Fenwick, supra note 53, at 735.
65. Id. at 736.
66. See Goosen, supra note 54, at 243-46 for a discussion of the practical
problems of contract enforcement.
67. Li Maoguan, Why "Laws go Unenforced", BEIJING REV., Sept. 11, 1989,
at 13, 13-14.
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laws.68 Private enterprises acting within the state plan are sub-
ject to arbitrary interference from officials. The situation is
slightly better for foreign-owned enterprises and joint ventures.
Foreign investment, however, cannot be separated from the do-
mestic economy, because foreign investment either relies on the
domestic economy for raw materials or labor, or competes with
it in the domestic or international market. Thus, problems
which affect domestic firms must also cause problems for for-
eign investors.
2. China After Tiananmen
It is argued that since the Tiananmen Square incident China
has moved towards an authoritarian regime that is the apotheo-
sis of the third way. Both the existence of state enterprises and
market reform have been encouraged. Party Secretary Jiang
Zemin set forth two requirements for the success of the third
way: 1) using the market to establish sustained non-inflationary
growth within a secure legal system without recognizing certain
fundamental rights, and 2) requiring state owned enterprises -
which operate regardless of market forces - to contribute to the
economy.69
In relation to state enterprises, the Chinese have developed
an intermediate stage for the transition of state enterprises from
a command structure to full privatization. Individual state en-
terprises have been given greater autonomy. They are allowed
to retain profits and use them for fixed investment, undertake
borrowing from banks, and have acquired greater freedom in the
acquisition of resources and disposition of production. Price re-
forms have allowed some state enterprises to sell goods at a
"free price" (meant to approximate the market price) rather
than at a fixed price.
Unfortunately, partial reform of state industry has provided
a ripe environment for corruption. Parallel markets for many
industrial products have provided incentives for shifting output
retained for the fixed-price market to the free market. Because
this has involved thwarting the directions of party officials, it
has also involved considerable corruption. Moreover, despite
their huge growth in numbers (from 50,000 in 1981 to 123,000 in
1989) the share of state enterprises in total output fell from sev-
68. For example, prosecutors of criminal cases may rank higher in the CCP
hierarchy than the judges trying the cases, making it unlikely that a judge will
find against the prosecution.
69. Jiang Zemin, supra note 4.
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enty-eight percent in 1981 to fifty-percent in 1988.70 This was
due to the increasing share achieved by a growing and more effi-
cient private sector.
Notwithstanding these problems, some scholars believe that
state-owned enterprises can have a positive influence on eco-
nomic development. 71 These scholars consider state-owned en-
terprises essential to the third way and adherance to the third
way as preferable to the problems that would be associated with
a radical move to a full market economy. They overlook one
fundamental aspect of the debate, however: whether state-
owned enterprises can continue to make a positive contribution
to an economy with a growing private sector in the absence of a
strong legal framework. This is, of course, a smaller part of the
wider debate regarding the role of the legal framework as a sine
qua non of even a quasi-market-oriented economy. Other econ-
omists argue that the strain on the economy produced by state
enterprises poses the greatest threat to the economic reforms.72
The role of a legal framework in the operation of the state-
owned enterprises has been examined by Geng Xiao. 73 Geng
gives a useful analysis of the "Contract Responsibility System"
which ostensibly governs the operations of such enterprises.
Officially, state enterprises are owned by all Chinese citi-
zens. In practice, however, none of the people have ownership
rights. The owners are usually identified as the central govern-
ment or local governments. The managers and workers in Chi-
nese state-owned enterprises, however, derive substantial
entitlements from their control over economic resources in the
enterprise and deem themselves to be, in a sense, owners of the
enterprise. 74 Moreover, ownership of the assets of the enter-
prise is not clearly delineated under the law, and the regulations
which control their operation go more to the objectives of the
70. CHINESE ECONOMIC YEARBOOK 35 (1989).
71. Nolan, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
72. Ma Guonan, et al., Economic Growth and Stability in China. This pa-
per was prepared for a conference at the Australian National University, Can-
berra, Nov. 11-14, 1991, in preparation of the book, CHINA'S REFORms AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH (forthcoming).
73. Geng Xiao, Property Rights Arrangements and Industrial Productiv-
ity. This paper was prepared for a conference at Australian National Univer-
sity, Canberra, Nov. 11-14, 1991, in preparation for the book, CHINA'S REFORMS
AND ECONOMIC GROwTH (forthcoming). This paper draws from Geng Xiao, The
Impact of Property Rights on Productivity and Equity in Post-Mao Chinese In-
dustrial Enterprises (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA).
74. These entitlements may include housing, medical care, and
superannuation.
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enterprise than to the distribution of the returns. Property
rights in post-Mao industrial enterprises have appeared in the
form of profit sharing arrangements;75 fringe benefits which are
informally controlled and "owned" by managers and workers;76
administrative regulations which control product price, wages,
and productivity; and government influence exerted through
loans, subsidies, and appointments.
Under this system, workers lack incentive to increase the
profitability of the enterprise because any losses by the enter-
prise have traditionally been made good by the central govern-
ment, which has declined to enforce the bankruptcy laws against
state enterprises perpetually in the red.77 Thus, workers strive
to maximize the entitlements which must be provided out of the
gross returns of the enterprise. As Ma, Garnaut, and Raby have
pointed out:
The greatest risk [to the economy] is still that state enterprise deficits,
out of control and widening in an inflationary episode through the new
feed back mechanisms, will be monetised in the absence of effective
enforcement of enterprise responsibility. While the state enterprises'
share of total economic activity continues to decline, their effective
claim on national financial resources has not declined commensu-
rately. The authorities, in any future period of inflation, will have the
power to close out that risk, simply by denying enterprises continued
access to unlimited credit. This would seem to be an attractive means
of removing what is probably the main risk to continued reform and
sustained rapid growth. It will only be used, however, if the authorities
are prepared to accept acceleration of the inexorable decline in the role
of large state enterprises in the national economy.
7 8
The other critical area of the Chinese economy is the do-
mestic private sector. This encompasses investment by both lo-
75. The profit sharing arrangements, set up between the Government
and the enterprises . . . explicitly define the formal and contractual
ownership structure of the enterprises. The right to profits is the most
important form of property right.... The negotiation of profit sharing
schemes for each period is usually intensive and changes... are diffi-
cult to arrange.
Geng Xiao, supra note 73, at 4.
76. Unlike fringe benefits in Western countries, which are part of a com-
petitively determined package of employee compensation, fringe benefits in
Chinese enterprises are more like welfare benefits. The amount and even the
kind of the fringe benefits are unspecified and may vary among enterprises, but
cannot be written into a contract nor unbundled and traded for other benefits.
Id.
77. Recently, however, the government has shown less willingness to sup-
port inefficient state-run enterprises. In place of state support, the government
has advocated the implementation of the revised Enterprise Law of 1988, which
authorizes and regulates the dissolution of inefficient state-run enterprises.
78. Ma et al., supra note 72, at 31-32.
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cal Chinese and overseas Chinese, primarily from Hong Kong
and Taiwan. Many of the investments directed by overseas Chi-
nese operate outside the framework provided for foreign invest-
ment referred to above. In the case of foreign investment
operating within the foreign legal framework, the impact on
contemporary China is at present difficult to determine. This is
because the inconsistent application of the taxation and subsidy
regimes to individual companies hinders analysis.
Although the Chinese leadership has specifically endorsed
the private sector of the economy,79 the legal position of this sec-
tor within Chinese society is even less certain than that of the
state-owned enterprises. The private sector is divided into indi-
vidual businesses (getihu) and the larger private enterprises
(siying qiye). The arrival of private firms was not accompanied
by a legal status. Instead, regulation was left to local authorities
with wide discretionary administrative powers. This made pri-
vate entrepreneurs extremely dependent on personal connec-
tions and, combined with the market irregularities of a mixed
economy, fostered the corruption of the administrative bureau-
cracy. Even when local authorities chose to promote private
business legally, they manipulated it in ways which were not al-
ways in accord with government policies.80
In the absence of a legal framework, private entrepreneurs
were subjected to arbitrary regulation. Unreasonable and arbi-
trary fees for licenses and laborious planning approval proce-
dures comprised some of the hindrances imposed upon private
entrepreneurs. A food stall operator at the Suizhou railway sta-
tion in Hubei, for example, was charged two separate "road oc-
cupation fees" by both the city construction office and the
department of public roads. In Chengdu, in 1988, individual
businesses could end up paying as many as twenty-nine different
levies of this kind on either a regular basis or as a part of govern-
ment "drives," such as for children's health or city beautifica-
tion. Since the Tiananmen crackdown, the amount and
arbitrariness of these levies seems to have increased."' In gen-
eral, state enterprises have been able to avoid such arbitrary
payments with the support of the government.8 2
79. Jiang Zemin, supra note 4.
80. PRIVATE BUSINESS AND THE STATE IN CHINA'S REFORMING ECONOMY 6
(forthcoming).
81. This is based on the authors' discussions with owners of private
enterprises.
82. PRIVATE BUSINESS AND THE STATE IN CHINA'S REFORMING ECONOMY,
supra note 80, at 13.
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In order to survive under these conditions, many private en-
terprises have formed special arrangements with state enter-
prises. These arrangements (guahu), which range from private
enterprises which specialize in processing for state and collective
enterprises, to those which merely pay a fee for the placement of
the stamp of the state enterprise on its registration form, be-
came quite common starting in 1988.83 The winners in this pro-
cess have been the middle level bureaucrats whose control over
goods, funds, and administrative approvals gave them considera-
ble power over the course of economic development in China.8 4
Of course, the interest of these bureaucrats lies not in further
reform, but in maintaining the disorderly, experimental transi-
tional stage which gives them the greatest degree of personal
discretion. During this stage they are able to use pre-reform,
planned-economy powers to manipulate the market economy.8 5
Private investors have also registered as collectives in order
to gain greater legal protection and more economic flexibility.
This enables them to get the tax benefits of collectives and al-
lows them to exceed the limit on the number of employees who
may work for a private enterprise. It has also, however, led to
some long legal cases where local governments have found and
expropriated "fake collectives."' 8
As part of the reforms, the government set up a bureau to
administer the private sector. Some private investors have been
able to use this bureau to protect them against the predations of
other government organs. The income of the bureaucrats in this
bureau comes from levies on the private sector, and thereby pro-
vides incentive for its protection. The government has also is-
sued directives on the taxation of private investors which have
been largely ignored by local officials where they have conflicted
with local needs. Taxation levies are apparently arbitrary and,
without proper accounting and bookkeeping on the part of the
tax office or the firm, can be altered at will. 87 Especially since
1989, heavy taxes, intended in part to slow growth in the over-
heated economy, have resulted in the dampening of the private
83. Id at 17.
84. Id at 19. This is a situation not far removed from that described by
Weber above. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
85. PRIVATE BusINESS AND THE STATE IN CHINA'S REFORMING ECONOMY,
supra note 80, at 19.
86. Collective Control of Income Distribution, in REMAKING PEASANT
CHINA (0. Odgaard ed., 1990).
87. PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND THE STATE IN CHINA'S REFORMING ECONOMY,
supra note 80, at 26.
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sector.88
These taxes were also part of a concerted campaign against
the private sector by those in the CCP who intend to maintain
the state-run sector of the economy. However, many local offi-
cials worked to protect the private sector and to consolidate its
position.8 9 At any rate, by this time the private sector was a vital
part of the Chinese economy. This plundering of the private sec-
tor ended in 1991 with Deng Xiaoping's renewed promotion of
economic reform and economic growth. Recent growth rates of
twenty percent per annum in Guangdong (Canton) are almost
entirely due to the unfettered growth of the private sector.
While little has yet been done to give the private sector the
legal security it requires to operate efficiently, the sector's sur-
vival indicates that China may be able to work towards the de-
velopment of a partial market economy without such legal
security. However, a demand for greater security will undoubt-
edly accompany the growing economic power of the private sec-
tor. As of yet, China has not developed a strong legal system to
govern either state-owned enterprises or the private sector, and
the legal structure which applies to foreign investment within
China is limited.
B. REFORMS IN LAOS
By 1979, the leadership in Laos realized that their country's
economic and social circumstances prohibited the complete na-
tionalization of industry. Nationalization of industry and collec-
tivization of agriculture were halted.9° Government policy
shifted to one close to the current Chinese position, namely, a
third way.9 1 However, this approach gradually weakened until
the government commenced a more radical introduction of a
free market economy accompanied by a substantive legal
structure.
The reforms adopted in 1979 were designed to slow collec-
tivization, ease restraints upon the sale of farm produce in the
free market, and introduce incentives for controlled private en-
terprise in towns.92 At the urging of experts from the Interna-
88. L. do Rosario, To Pay Tax is Glorious: China's Nascent Private Sector
Comes under Pressure, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Aug. 24, 1989, at 51.
89. PRIVATE BUsINESs AND THE STATE IN CHINA'S REFORMING ECONOMY,
supra note 80, at 30.
90. Chanda, supra note 36, at 123-24.
91. Luther, supra note 30, at 29-30.
92. BROWN & ZASLOFF, supra note 35, at 213.
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tional Monetary Fund (IMF), a new pricing policy was put into
effect in an attempt to coordinate official prices more closely
with supply and demand. Subsidies for food and other items
were to be limited to within five to fifteen percent of the free
market prices. Moreover, restrictions on interprovincial trade
were removed and traders were able to import goods more
freely. The legal and commercial structure of the Lao economy
remained largely unchanged. Hyperinflation followed the im-
plementation of these policies, and significant economic growth
did not follow immediately.
The year 1986 marked the end of the first five-year plan. A
radical shift away from socialism followed, a shift that was
forced on an unpopular government by a disaffected population.
Despite the initial reform of 1979, the failure of the economic
and political policies of the LPDP during its initial five years
squandered much of the goodwill that had greeted the new re-
gime. Remaining collectivization, controls, and taxes caused
widespread discontent in the countryside, and inflation and eco-
nomic deterioration contributed to a deep malaise in the towns.
Throughout the country there were negative attitudes toward
the severe regulation of travel, monitoring of personal and fam-
ily behavior, and tedious socialist propaganda. The heavy depen-
dence upon Vietnam, an historic enemy, had further eroded the
legitimacy of the regime. These divisions were accentuated by
the fact that the Prime Minister and Party Leader Kaysone
Phomivane was half Vietnamese and married to a Vietnamese.
In fact, it was difficult to discern a base of support in any signifi-
cant segment of society.93
In response to these mounting internal and external imbal-
ances, the government adopted a new system of economic man-
agement aimed at making the economy more responsive to
market forces. The cornerstone of a new reform plan begun in
1985-1986 was the New Economic Mechanism (NEM). Key
measures taken under the NEM included price deregulation and
monetization of the economy; devaluation of the Kip and the in-
troduction of a market exchange rate; commercial accountability
of state enterprises; restructuring of the banking system; and
trade liberalization, tax reforms, and the introduction of a for-
eign investment code. Public enterprises were given autonomy
to determine their own production levels, output mix, invest-
ment, employment, and wages. Agricultural procurement prices
were freed. Farmers received cash for their produce and the
93. I& at 216.
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state monopoly over the procurement and distribution of rice
was ended. The government authorized the private sector to
participate in the production and distribution of most goods and
services by issuing decrees which established private sector
rights, the autonomy of private firms, and the retention of after-
tax profits.
Economic growth was still spasmodic through the course of
the second five-year plan. It averaged six percent but fell to a
low of two percent in 1987 because of a downturn in rice and
timber production. Throughout this period inflation averaged
fifty percent but decreased near the end of the plan. Laos also
had a continuing balance of payments deficit and external debt
rose from $323 million to $1 billion during this period.94
These reforms, however, were instituted in the context of
what was still very much a command economy. Although the
economy relied heavily on free exchange and the profit motive,
the party remained committed to the idea of building a socialist
society in Laos, perceiving recent economic advances as laying
only the "material and technical" foundation for the transition
to socialism.95 The key feature of the reforms, however, was
their movement away from planning as a basis for establishing
desirable ends to programs which dealt with the means of re-
form. From this perspective they had moved from what Hayek
describes as "taxis" or directed order to "cosmos" or spontane-
ous order.9 To an extent, Laos had already eschewed the third
way by 1986 although it still lacked a strong legal system which
guaranteed private property rights.
During the second five-year plan Laos made the first moves
towards the establishment of a commercial legal structure. In
1987 a decree was passed introducing a new currency reform.
Under this decree a single floating exchange rate was estab-
lished for all transactions. Trading is now controlled by the
Ministries of Commerce and Finance but is conducted by ap-
proximately two dozen trading companies, including trading
companies organized by provincial government authorities. Li-
censed private sector importers and exporters hold private
shares in two of the state trading firms which are known as
"partnership companies." The State Bank administers exchange
94. Australian Int'l Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB), Laos Coun-
try Paper, Canberra, 1990, at 2.
95. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, LONDON, COUNTRY PROFILE: LAOS,
1990-1991.
96. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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controls. All foreign currency accounts are handled by its sub-
sidiary, the Laotian Foreign Trade Bank. This policy has been
so successful in establishing the convertibility of the domestic
currency that it can be used interchangeably with Thai Baht and
U.S. dollars in Laos. A thirty-two clause law on foreign invest-
ment was approved by the Supreme People's Assembly in April
1988. It offered relatively favorable terms to foreign investors as
a means of securing capital and technologies which might boost
production, especially of export commodities. Potential inves-
tors were able to enter into contractual arrangements with local
entities and to take equity positions in local private sector com-
panies, joint ventures, and private ventures with up to 100% for-
eign invested capital. Investors who established wholly owned
enterprises were allowed to invest for no more than fifteen
years, with the period to be extended at the government's discre-
tion. Substantial tax concessions were available to foreign inves-
tors under certain circumstances.
The regime, however, did not offer the security of invest-
ment that major Western investors were looking for, nor did it
provide a strong legal-commercial framework for doing busi-
ness. Moreover, this insecurity was exacerbated by the lack of
infrastructure and skilled labor. Therefore, although as of early
1990, the government had received 200 proposals for investment
and approved eighty-two of them, most of the agreed proposals
involved Thai investors who were primarily interested in timber
extraction and processing, small scale manufacturing, tourism,
and establishing business links with Vietnam.
The most fascinating aspect of the relative failure of the
market reforms of the second five-year plan to attract foreign
investment is that they did not lead to a return to conservative
socialist orthodoxy but rather acted as a spur to the introduction
of further market reforms. Tight monetary and credit policies
reduced the inflation rate from 75.9% in December 1989 to only
19.6% in December 1990 and to fifteen percent in March 1991.97
Laos also set about establishing a new framework of commercial
laws with the objective of completing the program by July 1992.
The new legal system of Laos consists of a network of legis-
lative acts adopted by the Peoples' Supreme Assembly (PSA),
decree laws adopted by the Council of Ministers as well as by
individual Ministries, and various other regulations promulgated
by Ministries and diverse government offices. Guiding these
97. LAO MINISTRY OF ExTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, GUIDE TO FOREIGN
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE LAO PDR 7 (June 1991).
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sources of law are the resolutions issued from time to time by
the LPDP.
Beginning with the Foreign Investment Law, the PSA be-
gan to pass legislation which would provide a framework for all
economic activity within Laos. In June 1990 the PSA passed the
Contract Law, the Property Law, the Inheritance Law, and the
State Banking Law. In its November session in 1990, the PSA
passed the Accounting Law, the Insurance Law, the Labor Law,
the Code of Civil Procedure, the Family Law, the Tort Law, and
the Nationality Law.
The Property Law expressly recognizes private property
rights and provides for the protection of such property. Articles
sixteen through eighteen of the law extend this protection to
private business enterprises which are entitled to be recognized
as judicial persons, and sets forth a number of guaranteed rights
including the right to sell production and to enter into business
associations within the country or abroad. Under the new Con-
tract Law the state now protects freedom of contract formation.
This includes the freedom to contract without restraint in rela-
tion to joint ventures. There is, for example, no maximum dura-
tion for ventures nor any minimum foreign equity participation
or foreign capital requirement. Both the Foreign Investment
Law and the Contract Law provide for the mediation and arbi-
tration of disputes.
The Labor and Accounting Laws are further examples of
Laos' attempts to accommodate the requirements of the market.
The Labor Law, while offering a sensible system of worker pro-
tection, assures important employer rights such as the right to
determine salaries and the right to hire and fire. The new Ac-
counting Law provides a basic framework for assuring that the
financial records of all Lao enterprises are easily understood and
subject to consistent standards.
The government's future priorities are the adoption of a se-
ries of laws dealing with procedures for commercial arbitration,
business associations, negotiable instruments, securities and
bankruptcy. As stated by the government: "The legal environ-
ment in the Lao PDR is rapidly changing from one which relied
exclusively on Ministerial decrees that could be modified at will
into one that puts strong emphasis on permanent business, com-
mercial and economic laws." 98
It now appears that Laos has tried and rejected the third
98. id at 19.
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way. It has implemented a strong legal system which the gov-
ernment states is the framework for a market-oriented eco-
nomic system. As is evident from the Chinese historical
experience, however, adoption of laws does not always mean
that these laws prevail over an alternative culture-based system.
One test of the movement towards an entrenched market-based
system is the persistence of state enterprises. It is these enter-
prises which represent the residue of privilege endowed by the
old planned system. They are the fundamental material of the
"iron rice bowl." Under the New Economic Mechanism in Laos,
it is intended that the state will disengage from the great major-
ity of these enterprises, and leave the private sector to develop
industry, mining, manufacturing, and trade. Although this dis-
engagement has already begun, its completion will take some
time. The private sector is still small and the state enterprises
will linger since there is no alternative to replace them.
Nevertheless, there is a surprisingly strong commitment on
the part of the LPDP to abolish the state enterprises. At the
Party Congress held in August 1990, the view was expressed that
the recent economic performance of Laos demonstrated that
government involvement in production through public enter-
prises makes control of the money supply extremely difficult in
a market-oriented system. When state-owned enterprises were
required to compete and charge market prices for the goods and
services which they produced, they incurred substantial losses.
Financing these losses was a major factor in the increase in the
money supply which had led to inflation.
This view was later confirmed by a leading LPDP figure
Khamsay Souphanouvong, the Minister for Finance, when he
said that with a few exceptions the state enterprises would be
privatized. The government aimed to create an environment
which would eliminate government intervention in business.99
This is substantially different to the approach of the Chinese
government.
Some problems remain. One significant problem is the lia-
bility of state corporations for their debt. Many of them claim
immunity from litigation and, therefore, debt repayment obliga-
tions. Because many suppliers of state corporations are from the
private sector, the impact of this immunity on the economy can
be significant. The question of the relationship between the cad-
res and the technocrats is also an uneasy one. The cadres are
reluctant to give up their politically-bequested privilege in ex-
99. ASIA ToDAY, Nov. 1991, at 3.
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change for the risk of the market. Nonetheless, seventy-five
percent of Laos' gross domestic product is now contributed by
the private sector and the third five-year plan aims at a real av-
erage annual growth of 6.6%. Foreign investment is now valued
at $300 million and the United States has replaced Thailand as
the largest investor in value terms.1°°
IV. CONCLUSION
There are two possible conclusions that could be derived
from comparing the political economies and legal systems of
China and Laos. First, it should be possible to compare the rates
of development of a planned economy which has moved to a
market economy (Laos) with one which has adopted the third
way (China). Unfortunately, statistics from both countries are
not sufficiently reliable for such comparisons to be of much
value at the present time. On the other hand, the more interest-
ing question is whether Laos represents a precedent for China.
This in turn requires a belief in Hayek's analysis that following
the third way is impossible and that movement towards a mar-
ket economy is inevitable.
If traditional economic jurisprudence is accepted as correct,
then China's persistence with the third way is doomed. Hayek
and Weber reflect this view when they maintain that a market
economy cannot exist without a strong legal system which main-
tains property rights. Hayek goes further in volume three of his
seminal work, Law Liberty and Legislation, where he maintains
that a market economy cannot exist in the absence of democratic
government. Observers of China whose views are grounded in
traditional Western economic or legal training feel that China's
adherence to the third way will lead to an increasingly unstable
inflation-prone economy. This, in turn, would cause the leader-
ship to choose between a market economy or central control.
On the other hand, Nolan reflects an economic tradition de-
rived from List, Marx, Engels and, more recently, Deng Xiaop-
ing and Chen Yun. It holds that market economics can be fused
with an authoritarian state and the elements of a command
economy to produce sustained economic growth without socio-
political disruptions such as those currently being experienced
in Eastern Europe. The important feature of such a social and
economic structure is that, as asserted by its supporters, it can
persist without the existence of a strong legal and commercial
100. I at 16.
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system. Nolan emphasises that China has produced extraordina-
rily good results despite many serious problems. He points out
that in the first decade of reform China outperformed almost all
developing countries in terms of output, growth, and export per-
formance, yet remained relatively free of foreign debt and
inflation.
It is impossible from the data available to clearly assess
which view is correct. One thing on which both groups of ob-
servers agree is that the private sector is a vital part of the Chi-
nese economy. This appears to make movement in the direction
of more market orientation inevitable. As the dependence of
the Chinese economy on the private sector increases so will the
private sector's power to demand reform.
From this point of view, what happened in Laos is a micro-
cosm of what could happen in China. In Laos, as the importance
of the private sector increased, so did its demands for laws which
guaranteed its security.'01 Laos appears to be adopting a legal
system which will provide such security; however, its practical
effects remain unclear. If these recent changes are implemented
successfully, Laos rather than Eastern Europe, may be the
benchmark for China's progress.
We conclude that China will eventually have to make the
transition to a full market economy if it wishes to enjoy sus-
tained economic growth.'0 2 In this case, lawmakers will have to
eschew notions of traditional law and adopt a commercial legal
system which is consistent with the operation of the market. On
the other hand, the transitional period of the third way should
101. [A] legal framework that is impartially enforced is critical to a
(market) economy's functioning. The existence of law and order, the
enforceability of contracts through the rule of law, bankruptcy laws, a
tax system are all important components of such an economy. More-
over such laws have to be transparent and law enforcement has to be
equitable.
HELEN HUGHES, CONSTRAINTS ON EXPORT GROWTH IN CHINA 25 (forthcoming).
102. The 14th Party Congress of CCP in October 1992 (held just before the
article went to press) has confirmed this trend. Party General Secretary Jiang
Zemin in his keynote speech urged that markets be expanded to embrace
"bonds, stocks.... technology, labour, information, [and] real estate, so as to
form an integrated national market system open to all." Shareholding will
"help promote the separation of the functions of government from those of en-
terprises." The Public sector--defined to include the grey area of "collective"
enterprises-will remain "predominant," but must compete "in the market on
an equal footing." See Lincoln Kaye, Dengism Enshrined, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Oct. 22, 1992, at 10-11.
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not be counted as a loss. It may be that the adoption of this tran-
sitional phase in China has enabled it to avoid the upheaval
which has occurred in Eastern Europe.
